Privacy-Preserving Passive DNS by Papadopoulos, Pavlos et al.
computers
Article
Privacy-Preserving Passive DNS
Pavlos Papadopoulos 1,* , Nikolaos Pitropakis 1,* , William J. Buchanan 1 and Owen Lo 1
and Sokratis Katsikas 2,3
1 School of Computing Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh EH10 5DT, UK;
B.Buchanan@napier.ac.uk (W.J.B.); O.Lo@napier.ac.uk (O.L.)
2 Department of Information Security and Communication Technology, Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, 2815 Gjøvik, Norway; sokratis.katsikas@ntnu.no
3 Faculty of Pure and Applied Sciences, Open University of Cyprus, 2220 Latsia, Cyprus
* Correspondence: pavlos.papadopoulos@napier.ac.uk (P.P.); N.Pitropakis@napier.ac.uk (N.P.)
Received: 14 July 2020; Accepted: 9 August 2020; Published: 12 August 2020


Abstract: The Domain Name System (DNS) was created to resolve the IP addresses of web servers to
easily remembered names. When it was initially created, security was not a major concern; nowadays,
this lack of inherent security and trust has exposed the global DNS infrastructure to malicious actors.
The passive DNS data collection process creates a database containing various DNS data elements,
some of which are personal and need to be protected to preserve the privacy of the end users. To this
end, we propose the use of distributed ledger technology. We use Hyperledger Fabric to create a
permissioned blockchain, which only authorized entities can access. The proposed solution supports
queries for storing and retrieving data from the blockchain ledger, allowing the use of the passive DNS
database for further analysis, e.g., for the identification of malicious domain names. Additionally,
it effectively protects the DNS personal data from unauthorized entities, including the administrators
that can act as potential malicious insiders, and allows only the data owners to perform queries over
these data. We evaluated our proposed solution by creating a proof-of-concept experimental setup
that passively collects DNS data from a network and then uses the distributed ledger technology to
store the data in an immutable ledger, thus providing a full historical overview of all the records.
Keywords: passive DNS (Domain Name System); privacy-preserving; distributed ledger; blockchain;
hyperledger fabric; private data collection
1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) translates human-readable domain names to machine-readable
IP addresses [1]. An end-user can thus access a website through a web browser using a combination of
a name, e.g., “example” and a TLD, e.g., “.com”, “.uk”, “.us”. Figure 1 illustrates the steps involved in
the DNS query resolution process. DNS provides a foundation element of the trustworthiness of the
Internet, but its simplicity and general lack of trust has led to a range of security issues. Botnets [2],
parking domains [3] and domain squatting [4] are examples of types of malicious DNS use. To identify
DNS abuse, the DNS queries and responses often have to be collected for further analysis.
Florian Weimer is the creator of the Passive DNS systems [5]; he used recursive name servers to
log responses received from different name servers and then copied this logged data onto a central
database. The almost instantaneous recording of the majority of passive DNS data before the recursive
name server means that Passive DNS is composed of responses and referrals from online authoritative
name servers. These logged data are deduped, compressed, time-stamped, and then copied onto a
central database where they are analysed and archived.
Passive DNS collects the DNS queries along with the IP address of the host that is making the
queries. In situations when the passive DNS collector is placed within the ISP (Internet Service Provider)
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or at a TLD (Top-Level Domain) server, each query contains the IPs of the end-users and can be linked
back to them. Both the GDPR and NIST consider IP addresses as personal data when a correlation of
the queries and the identity of the end-user can be made [6,7]. When it comes to public DNS servers,
end-users can benefit from better (than the DNS servers of their ISP) stability, availability and protection
against certain DNS attacks, but they expose their personal data to companies such as Google [8],
Cloudflare [9], and OpenDNS [10] that could profit from commercially exploiting these data [11].
It follows that there is a clear need to appropriately protect data collected, stored, and processed to
identify malicious domain names through the use of passive DNS data analysis methods. The majority
of existing solutions for passive DNS data analysis provide APIs for queries of the related data.
However, the collection of passive DNS data is being questioned [12], since the privacy of the end-users
that contributed their passive DNS collections may be compromised [13].
Figure 1. Overview of the Domain Name System (DNS).
This paper proposes a solution to the aforementioned problem and outlines Privacy
Preserving Passive (PRESERVE DNS), a system that collects passive DNS data for further analysis,
whilst preserving the privacy of the end-users, by virtue of storing the data in an immutable distributed
ledger. This immutable ledger can be used to identify abuses and malicious DNS usage, such as for
domain squatting and botnets. Blockchain technology can also provide the complete history of the
data transactions, without the need for a central authority to control it. The proposed solution is not
connected with any passive DNS database provider, such as Farsight (DNSDB) [14], and VirusTotal [15].
Furthermore, it provides transparency of the stored data, thus establishing trust with the users, while at
the same time allowing authorized entities to query only non-personal data.
Not all data collected are personal or in need of the same level of privacy protection.
Selectively protecting personal data, such as source IP addresses, is possible in a permissioned
distributed ledger. In a permissioned-protected field of an immutable ledger, even the administrators
do not have access to the private data. This choice allows only the data owners to query the data.
In this paper, Hyperledger Fabric is the selected permissioned blockchain platform. This platform
has the advantage of resolving potential scalability issues since consensus of participating peers and
their respective permissions can be configured. Additionally, with the encryption and anonymisation
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functionality provided within Hyperledger Fabric, participating entities can securely provide passive
DNS collections to the system.
The contributions of our work can be summarised as follows:
• We have developed PRESERVE DNS, a privacy-preserving passive DNS data solution,
by leveraging distributed ledger technology. The implementation of this solution does not require
any changes to the server side of the current DNS infrastructure.
• We have evaluated the robustness and security of PRESERVE DNS.
• We have comparatively evaluated the performance of PRESERVE DNS against a traditional
database with column level encryption, and against an existing alternative solution.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides the background on
blockchain technology that is necessary to ensure the self-sustainability of the paper. The relevant
literature is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 the proof-of-concept implementation of PRESERVE
DNS, which also serves as the evaluation testbed, are discussed. Section 5 presents the process and
the results of the evaluation of PRESERVE DNS. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and
suggests some future work.
2. Background
2.1. DNS Privacy Concerns
The DNS infrastructure is outdated and has been created without considering security or privacy.
This leads to DNS being targeted by numerous malicious actors that try to exploit its vulnerabilities
to get profit from unaware end-users. Malevolent individuals are able to profit directly from their
victims, or by selling batches of their private information [16–18]. A number of current privacy issues
cannot be fully resolved without a complete redesign of DNS [19]. Fortunately, new solutions are
being proposed and developed to further enhance the security of DNS and to preserve the privacy
of its end-users. Blockchain DNS solutions promise to resolve existing DNS privacy issues [20–22].
Our work combines part of the old DNS infrastructure with the new blockchain technology.
2.2. Blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology [23] that became popular as the foundational block
of the bitcoin cryptocurrency [24,25]. Over the past few years it has seen rapid growth, both in terms
of research and commercial usage. A blockchain is a cryptographically linked list of records that
maintains a publicly verifiable ledger without the need for a central authority; as such, it is a new
paradigm of trust between entities in various application domains. The technology behind blockchains
originated in cryptocurrency applications but its advancements over existing architectures motivated
researchers to apply it to a broad spectrum of application domains [26–30]. The main benefits of this
technology are the decentralized nature, immutability, inherent anonymity, resilience, trust, security,
autonomy, integrity and scalability.
Blockchains can be categorized according to who can access them as public, private or consortium.
Anyone can join a public blockchain and act as a simple node or as miner/validator; no approval by any
third party is needed. In the case of a private or consortium blockchains, the owner restricts network
access, to herself or to a group of participants. Blockchains can also be categorized according to whether
each entity requires authorization to perform an action or not as permissioned or permissionless
respectively [31].
2.3. Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric is an open source enterprise-grade permissioned distributed ledger technology
platform [32]. The main participants in a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain are the peers, the organizations,
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the orderers, the Certificate Authority, and the Membership Service Provider (MSP). Participants perform
actions on the ledger by using chaincode [30].
The chaincode is a blockchain program that runs autonomously and performs a set of actions
defined by the developer. It is written in common general-purpose programming languages such
as Javascript, Java or Go. The chaincode is installed and instantiated in the peers and the orderer,
and contains all the blockchain’s logic, security mechanisms and capabilities.
Peers are the most crucial entities on the blockchain network. They install the chaincode, and they
host the ledger. Peers can host more than one ledgers and chaincodes, enabling private communications
with other entities.
Organizations are groups of peers whose actions can be defined by policy [33]. The network is
formed by different organizations, that all together form a consortium [34]. It is possible that different
ledgers can be present at the same time and only authorized organisations and entities have access
to them.
Ordering Service or orderer is the entity that receives the transactions from the peers’ applications
and updates the ledger according to the defined consensus mechanism. The consensus mechanism
can be defined during the time of creation, and complex fault-tolerant algorithms can be used for the
validation of each transaction [35].
The Certificate Authority is the entity that assigns an identity to each peer. The Membership
Service Provider (MSP) is the entity that validates the identity of each participant in the blockchain
network. It manages and examines all the cryptographic mechanisms and certificates that the peers
use to perform actions in the ledger [32].
3. Related Work
Despite the success of Weimer’s concept, the issue of the impact of the collection of passive DNS
data to end-user privacy was soon raised, as users could be clueless if a passive DNS collector is placed
in their DNS resolver [7]. Consequently, the security research community focused on this issue and
several approaches addressing the issue were published.
One of the first approaches to mitigate the impact of the issue was to use tools that could
eliminate confidential information from collected network packets [36]. Another approach argued that
a Cryptography-based Prefix preserving Anonymization algorithm [37] or other encryption techniques
that would secure the IP prefix [38] should be employed. At the other end of the spectrum, an entirely
different solution was proposed: the collection of active DNS data [39]. This was made possible by
creating a system called Thales which can systematically query and collect large volumes of active
DNS data using as input an aggregation of publicly accessible sources of domain names and URLs that
have been collected for several years by the research team. These sources include but are not limited to
Public Blacklists, the Alexa ranking, the Common Crawl project, and various Top Level Domain (TLD)
zone files. This system’s output is a refined dataset that can be easily used by the security community.
Liang et al. [40] proposed a system that combines two technologies, namely blockchain and cloud
computing to effectively and efficiently create a decentralised DNS records database. To ensure the
security of the stored data, they employed a hashed version of the sensitive data as a proof-of-identity,
and allowed only the administrator of the system to correlate each identity to the hashed data.
This is a successful countermeasure against outsider malicious actors, but sensitive data may still be
compromised when attacks are launched by insiders. In contrast, the data in PRESERVE DNS are
stored by the users themselves and are available in a separate ledger only to them; the remaining
networks only have access to a hash of the actual data.
Liu et al. [22] proposed a decentralized, blockchain-based DNS (DecDNS) system which maintains
a stored database of DNS records and performs the resolution using the nodes of the blockchain.
The advantages and default security mechanisms of blockchain, such as the tamper-proof state of the
data and the resilience against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are important features
of the system. Moreover, the solution does not require significant changes to the existing DNS
Computers 2020, 9, 64 5 of 16
infrastructure. However, the privacy of the users is not preserved; the sacalability of the solution is
questionable; and performance is a challenge, as all the data are in a hashed form, and they should be
decrypted in every DNS query. In contrast, in PRESERVE DNS public data needed for further analysis
are in plain text, and only authorized entities are allowed to query them.
Rather than attempting to secure the existing DNS infrastructure, another line of research
proposes the development of a more secure, easily audited, transparent domain names organization.
Examples are systems such as Namecoin [41] and Blockstack [42], that created a substitute of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), where each user does not need to
buy a domain name from a third party. The proposed system is built on a blockchain network, bitcoin in
this case, where users can “mine” cryptocurrency. Then users are able to use this cryptocurrency
to buy domain names with new “.bit”, “.id” TLDs that did not exist before [42]. The privacy of the
users can be ensured since their identity is protected by bitcoin’s identity management mechanism.
The downside of these systems is that the users need specific extensions to be able to query blockchain
registered domain names.
Along similar lines, Kalodner et al. [41] and Ali et al. [42] proposed solutions that can
address common DNS issues and attacks, by changing the existing infrastructure to a more secure,
resilient version with far more opportunities, security mechanisms and defences. However attractive
these proposals may seem, the requirement to make changes to the existing DNS global infrastructure
is rather unrealistic. In contrast, PRESERVE DNS is able to secure the existing DNS functionality
without the need for major changes at the server, thus offering the opportunity for a faster transition
without downtime or enormous expenses.
DNS Trusted Sharing Model (DNSTSM) is a recently published approach, which also uses the
Hyperledger Fabric platform [43]. DNSTSM is a system resilient to various DNS attacks, that achieves
a high performance of DNS resolutions, and does not require changes in the current global DNS
infrastructure. However, DNSTSM is built on the older v1.1 version of Hyperledger Fabric, which does
not have the private data collection feature as the v1.4 version that PRESERVE DNS is built upon
does. This means that DNSTSM cannot preserve end-user privacy without effectively re-designing its
architecture so as to be able to exploit features available in newer versions of Hyperledger Fabric.
PRESERVE DNS differentiates itself from previous works in various ways. By leveraging the
private data collection feature provided by Hyperledger Fabric, in PRESERVE DNS two separate
ledgers are created, one for the public DNS information used for further analysis, and one for the
sensitive data. The latter is stored only on the peer nodes of the owners of the data, and only they
can query it. Furthermore, PRESERVE DNS stores the passive DNS data collection through storing
API requests directly from the users, making use of each user’s identity. This method enhances the
privacy of the users as only themselves have access to their personal data and are able to query
them. Additionally, PRESERVE DNS is efficient, since the rest of the data are in plain text, and only
trusted validated users are allowed to query them. Data are available through query API requests to
authorized entities, and further analysis of passive DNS data towards, e.g., malicious domain name
identification and domain squatting is possible.
Finally, as will be discussed in Section 5, PRESERVE DNS is able to thwart various DNS attacks
such as DDoS, DNS fast-flux, DNS amplification attacks. In situations where the PRESERVE DNS
distributed DNS records database is being used for the DNS resolution, the DNS cache poisoning
attack, one of the most difficult attacks to defend against, can be thwarted as well.
A summary of salient characteristics of PRESERVE DNS and of the approaches discussed above
is depicted in Table 1.
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Table 1. Comparison of methods.
Method Attack Thwarting User Privacy Existing DNS Infrastructure
DecDNS Liu et al. [44] X X X
Liang et al. [40] X X X
Namecoin Kalodner et al. [41] X X X
Blockstack Ali et al. [42] X X X
DNSTSM Yu et al. [43] X X X
PRESERVE DNS X X X
4. Proof-of-Concept Implementation
4.1. Architecture
In order to demonstrate the workings of PRESERVE DNS, and to evaluate its operation and
performance, we developed a proof-of-concept implementation, whose architecture is depicted in
Figure 2. This proof-of-concept implementation comprises a private data collection that contains the
Passive DNS data and is controlled by two authorized Organizations with regards to reproducing a
Passive DNS infrastructure. Each Organization contains two Peers that own the blockchain ledger.
Each Passive DNS data record consists of ten fields, namely the associated blockchain and record
IDs; the domain name; its IP address; the Time-To-Live (TTL); two timestamp fields (in seconds and
milliseconds); the number of times that the user visited the domain; the IP address of the end-user;
and the server that performed the resolution. The last fields contain personal data and form the private
data collection, which is accessible only by the Peers of Organization 1; others may access only the
non-personal data. Note that read and write query times of the Peers are measured as part of the
evaluation of the proposed infrastructure, reported in the next section.
As shown in Figure 2, the implementation involves a network of a number of computers that
run various operating systems (Microsoft Windows 10, Apple MacOS, Kali Linux and Ubuntu Linux)
and use a distributed infrastructure as a local DNS resolver. Specifically, a Kubernetes pod [45] has
been configured locally as the DNS resolver of the network. The Kubernetes pod acts as a host
machine, using its own IP address. The remaining machines use the DNS resolver as their DNS
server, and the local DNS resolver can resolve the DNS queries itself, it can use the ISP’s DNS
servers, or one of the public DNS servers provided by companies such as Google [8], Cloudflare [9]
or OpenDNS [10]. In our case, the specified DNS resolver uses Google’s public DNS servers for the
resolution of the DNS queries, eliminating the chance of a “bad” ISP DNS resolver for each DNS
query [46]. A passive DNS data collector is needed to collect the DNS queries and responses to store
the data in a database for further analysis. This configuration is able to capture queries such as A,
AAAA, MX records and the translations between their servers with the domain names. The stored
data involves the IPs of the machines that performed the DNS queries and the server that performed
the DNS resolution. The DNS resolver passively collects and stores this information in a database,
using passivedns from gamelinux [47], and stores the data in JSON format. The system built for the
resolution of the DNS queries uses Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) version 9. BIND is the most
common implementation of a DNS resolver, and it depends solely on the nameserver it queries [44].
The technical specifications of the computers that performed the queries meet the minimum docker
container needs. The technical specifications of the distributed infrastructure that hosts the blockchain
system are as follows: 6th Generation 2.0 GHZ dual-core Intel Core i5 CPU, with 8 GB RAM running
at 1866 MHz and 256 GB PCIe-based flash storage.
This proof-of-concept configuration gives rise to privacy concerns, since IPs can be correlated to
the identities of the end-users that visited the sites. However, we emphasize that this configuration is
being used only for creating the Passive DNS database; as such its privacy is outside the scope of this
paper. The privacy of Passive DNS data collector systems is ensured by PRESERVE DNS that employs
a blockchain solution to store the DNS data in an immutable ledger.
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The blockchain solution should adhere to the following specifications:
• Participants of the network should be able to easily query the data stored in the blockchain.
• The queried data should be available only to authorized entities in order to be analysed further
for its maliciousness or even to be used as a distributed DNS database protected from various
attacks and misuses.
• Consequently, specific data segments on the ledger, e.g., IPs of the end-users should be available
only to themselves and remain private to all other entities.
• To achieve consensus for storing the data, peers should approve the transaction only for
authorized entities who call the corresponding storing procedure. Additionally, for each
transaction related to data storage processes, new blocks should be created and added to the
ledger, and all the participants should update their “local” ledgers to include these new blocks.
Figure 2. Privacy Preserving Passive (PRESERVE DNS) proof-of-concept implementation architecture
for the test data collection.
4.2. The Blockchain
The Hyperledger Fabric platform is used for implementing the blockchain. As illustrated in
Figure 3, the blockchain infrastructure is composed of two organisations of two peers each; a certificate
authority; and an orderer. All the entities of the blockchain are docker containers, authorized for
performing their respective purpose according to their identity. The identities issued are X.509 digital
certificates signed by the Certificate Authority and checked by the MSP [48]. During the creation of
the blockchain network, the state database that is going be used is defined [32]; we used CouchDB,
a complete database available in Hyperledger Fabric that stores data in key-value pairs and also offers
rich queries functionality [49]. The chaincode is written in the Go programming language.
The first organisation acts as an end-user that stores its passive DNS data collection in the
blockchain. Since this data includes personal information (i.e., the IP of the client’s machine and the IP
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of the DNS resolver), they should remain inaccessible by all the other participants of the blockchain,
including the second ISP organisation. A private data collection has been used to allow only the first
organisation to query for protected data. All the other recipients are able to query only data that they
are entitled to access. If an unauthorized peer attempts to query protected data, the query is rejected
and an error message is returned.
Hyperledger Fabric provides chaincode APIs to use with command-line (CLI) tools. These chaincode
APIs extend the functionalities of the peers and are distinguished in the Init API, Invoke API and
Query API classes. Init API is used when initialization or upgrade of the chaincode is executed. Invoke
API and Query API are used when storing or reading transactions to the ledger are performed [50].
Figure 3. Hyperledger fabric infrastructure.
Peers of the blockchain can store data on the ledger using Hyperledger Fabric’s Invoke API.
First they have to declare their identity and then use the Invoke API with the corresponding storing
function and the arguments in JSON format to send each transaction to the orderer. The orderer receives
the data and performs the requested storing function. In case of success, this procedure will create a
new block on the ledger and will send an update signal to each of the peers to update their ledgers.
To receive data from the ledger, peers use the Query API. They declare their identity and then
use the corresponding query function with the arguments in JSON format to send the transaction to
the orderer. The orderer receives the transaction and subsequently displays only those data to the
recipients that they are allowed to access according to the defined query function and the private data
collection configuration. The specified identity functionality enables a peer to query only specific
blocks. Some data, such as the IPs of each end-user, must remain private and available only to them.
Some fundamental differences exist between the “traditional” public and the “permissioned”
blockchain infrastructures as discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. One of these is the consensus mechanism,
which in Hyperledger Fabric can be configured. The consensus mechanism used in the proof-of-concept
implementation of PRESERVE DNS requires at least one peer from any organization to accept a
transaction, in order for the transaction to be considered valid. Another major difference is the time
taken for transaction processing [51]. Bitcoin requires approximately ten minutes per new block that
contains a few transactions. Compared to that, Hyperledger Fabric can process a few thousands
transactions per second [32], while maintaining the promoted privacy and security. A similar feature
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in-context in “traditional” blockchains with Hyperledger Fabric is the Peers entity that could be
compared to “miners” or full nodes [52].
5. Evaluation
5.1. Security Evaluation—DNS Attacks
Common DNS attacks are DNS DDoS [53], DNS fast-flux [54] and DNS cache poisoning [55];
PRESERVE DNS can thwart these attacks as follows:
• The proof-of-concept implementation of PRESERVE DNS described in the previous section
contains only one orderer. A potential DDoS attack against the orderer container may result in
particular writes to the ledger to be blocked. However, in a production environment, this attack
can be prevented using more ordering services under the same Kafka cluster. When one orderer
fails, the Kafka cluster assigns another orderer to complete the transaction.
• In a fast-flux DNS attack a malicious actor uses short-timed time-to-live (TTL) records to change
legitimate to malicious servers under the same hostname. PRESERVE DNS thwarts Fast-flux
DNS attacks, since the administrator of the blockchain configures the TTL of the ledger’s blocks.
• PRESERVE DNS is able to thwart DNS cache poisoning attacks, but only if it is being used as
the local DNS database in the system, as in the case of our proof-of-concept implementation.
This means that the local DNS resolver should query PRESERVE DNS for every DNS query
instead of using the local DNS cache first. A potential solution to this issue in a production
environment is to continually update the local DNS cache with the data from the blockchain
using a scheduled job.
5.2. Security Evaluation—Blockchain Attacks
Blockchain is an immutable ledger, and the data stored cannot be manipulated by malicious
actors. Each transaction needs to be authorized by the policy, and unauthorized requests are rejected
automatically. All the functions and security mechanisms of the blockchain are included in the
chaincode that is installed in each participant. A collection configuration is developed to advise the
orderer about the state of the stored data, the time of their availability until they purge, and all entities
that have access to them.
Each peer is obliged to prove its identity to the orderer before being allowed to perform a
transaction. According to the configured policy, the store and query transactions are restricted to peers
which are not included in the policy, thus preserving the privacy of the stored data. These fundamental
principles eliminate the possibility of an unauthorized, malicious actor to store arbitrary data to the
ledger. Furthermore, a malicious actor is overall unable to query data. The personal data can be
queried only by specified entities and the remaining data are available only to participants.
DDoS attacks against the blockchain are thwarted as well. Hyperledger Fabric uses docker
containers to act as peers of the blockchain. Each peer has the whole ledger stored, including the
history of each transaction. PRESERVE DNS is composed of Docker containers acting as the participants
of the network. This means that when a Docker container fails the query is passed on to another active
peer. When the failed peer recovers, it initiates the gossip protocol to update its ledger with missing
entries, from the rest of the peers. For a successful DDoS attack to take place against PRESERVE DNS,
all the peers should be successfully attacked at the same time; this is highly improbable and practically
impossible. Another solution to this problem is to develop the docker containers inside a Kubernetes
cluster. In case of a container failure, Kubernetes is able to restart it or create an identical twin to
operate as the failed one.
Attacks such as DNS amplification attacks and some zero-day DNS attacks against the blockchain
infrastructure are not possible, because to launch them data in the ledger would need to be altered.
PRESERVE DNS is operationally resilient, since it is composed of distributed peer nodes and
organisations that have identical ledgers.
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Further, infrastructure continuity in PRESERVE DNS is ensured as long as at least one peer node
is operating normally [56]. Accordingly, PRESERVE DNS has no single point of failure.
A significant issue for permissioned blockchains such as the Hyperledger Fabric is the human
factor, considered to be the weakest link in any system’s security chain. Key management is a
crucial part of the blockchain infrastructure’s security. Potential theft of a legitimate user’s identity
by a malicious actor can lead to unauthorized queries and arbitrary storage of data in the ledger.
Additionally, the chaincode is compiled and can run completely autonomously, but it is coded by
humans. Thus, it is possible that the code contains bugs that are discovered late in the infrastructure
lifecycle [32].
Despite the enhanced security that the blockchain technology enjoys, it is still young, and new
kinds of attacks are most likely to be discovered in the future. One potential source of threats is the
advancement of quantum computing, against which most of the existing cryptographic techniques
are defenseless. Thus, whenever possible, it is recommended to use a quantum-robust algorithm if its
overhead on the performance of the system is tolerable [57].
5.3. Performance Evaluation
The last part of the evaluation compares the performance of PRESERVE DNS against an alternative
blockchain solution, namely Blockstack, and against a traditional database that offers column level
privacy, such as PostgreSQL. Blockstack uses by default the Gaia decentralised storage system [58].
Even if it does not offer the enhanced privacy of PRESERVE DNS, it is a promising alternative to the
current DNS infrastructure. On the other hand, the PostgreSQL database is the most popular option
for production environments because it is a database server that offers extra functionalities, such as
remote connections [59]. Additionally, the PostgreSQL database server can run isolated in a Docker
container [60].
As already discussed in Section 3, the DNSTSM system [43] is very similar to ours. However,
being based on an older version of Hyperledger Fabric, it is unable to create a complete privacy-
preserving infrastructure. Hence, we did not compare its performance to that of PRESERVE DNS,
and we limited ourselves to a comparison of security levels, presented in Table 1.
The time taken to perform a (a) Read data and (b) Write Data transaction in each of the three
alternatives (PRESERVE DNS, PostgreSQL database and Blockstack’s Gaia decentralised storage)
for various numbers of DNS entries (10, 1000, 10,000, 100,000, 1,000,000) is used as the performance
metric. The results are depicted in Table 2 and in Figure 4. As illustrated in Figure 4 the PostgreSQL
database query time (or query overhead) is less for a small number of DNS Entries but raises linearly
with each additional DNS entry. Data stored in Blockstack’s Gaia decentralised storage is in the form
of key-value pairs and is stored off-chain. On the other hand, the query time in PRESERVE DNS
is unchanged, since it queries indexed items stored in a distributed ledger. The benefits of using a
distributed solution, such as PRESERVE DNS, are even greater in production environments because the
passive DNS data analysis consists of millions of DNS entries and scaling is necessary. All comparisons
were done over the same architecture, illustrated in Section 4; they were executed independently and
in isolation, to eliminate bias and ensure the accuracy of the results.
Furthermore, we benchmarked the CPU and Memory performance of our proposed solution.
Figure 5 shows that the CPU usage of the blockchain nodes during Read queries workflow is low
(5–10%) over a varying number of DNS entries (1000, 10,000, 100,000). Additionally, the Write queries
workflow follows a similar CPU usage pattern (<20%). The blockchain nodes in the form of Docker
containers are distinguished in the first and second Peers (Peer0, Peer1) of Organization 1 and
Organization 2 (Org1, Org2). Moreover, the last CLI container is the container that is being used
by Hyperledger Fabric for the command-line interface usability [61]. In Figure 5d,e, the CLI container’s
CPU usage fluctuates rapidly and conceals the CPU usage of the blockchain nodes. This is reasonable
as the CLI container is being directly used by the authors for each transaction. Furthermore, it is also
noteworthy that the CPU usage of the blockchain nodes is less than 20%.
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Table 2. Read Data/Write Data transaction time in milliseconds (ms) per number of DNS entries.
Number of DNS Entries 10 1000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
PRESERVE DNS Read Data 180 ms 180 ms 180 ms 180 ms 180 msWrite Data 230 ms 230 ms 230 ms 230 ms 230 ms
PostgreSQL Database Read Data 2 ms 3 ms 10 ms 44 ms 220 msWrite Data 4 ms 5 ms 6 ms 9 ms 11 ms
Blockstack Ali et al. [58] Read Data 360 ms 360 ms 360 ms 360 ms 360 msWrite Data 530 ms 530 ms 530 ms 530 ms 530 ms
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Figure 6 depicts the average memory usage of each blockchain node, in addition to the minimum
and maximum values scored. The memory usage for each Read and Write query measured over a
varying number of DNS entries (1000, 10,000, 100,000) is considerably low. In this figure the naming
of the docker containers follows the convention described above. Contrary to Figure 5, the memory
usage of the CLI container does not fluctuate significantly.
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6. Conclusions and Future Work
DNS is the Internet’s phone book. Its services are and will continue to be invaluable for years to
come. Its main setback is that it was built without strong consideration of its security, thus allowing
malicious parties to abuse it. Part of the defence against such abuse is the processing of DNS resolution
data, collected by passive DNS, towards identifying malicious actors such as, e.g., malicious domain
names. However, this process involves collecting and processing personal end-user data. As the
whole world becomes data centric, securing such data becomes paramount, hence the need for
privacy-preserving passive DNS.
We proposed PRESERVE DNS, an environment that can be used for passive DNS data analysis
whilst ensuring end-user privacy. We provided a proof-of-concept implementation and we evaluated
the performance of PRESERVE DNS against another blockchain solution, namely Blockstack,
and against a traditional database that offers column level privacy, such as PostgreSQL. PRESERVE
DNS was found to be resilient to various attacks and to impose less query overhead in high volumes
of data than that of existing alternatives. In our proof-of-concept implementation, PRESERVE DNS
achieves a read query time of 180 ms in every tested number of DNS entries. Similarly, in every tested
number of DNS entries, Blockstack achieves a flat read query time of 360 ms. In contrast, the traditional
PostgreSQL database read query time increases over higher volumes of DNS entries, achieving 220 ms
in 1,000,000 entries.
Existing techniques for analysing passive DNS data, such as Notos [62], EXPOSURE [63], and [12]
can use PRESERVE DNS to achieve the same functionality without violating the privacy of the
end-users. PRESERVE DNS can also be set-up online, to provide further services to end-users. It can
be used as a public DNS resolver that also passively collects the queries and responses, for malicious
domain name detection, transparently to the end-users. PRESERVE DNS can be part of an ISP’s or
a TLD’s infrastructure, or it can be used as part of a passive DNS data analysis system. In the latter
option, users that store their DNS data to the system for further analysis can be sure that their privacy
is not violated and only themselves may query their personal data. PRESERVE DNS achieves this
trustworthiness without the need for users to trust another third party or the system itself.
As future work, we plan to extend the functionality of PRESERVE DNS, and to produce a
cloud-oriented implementation, that would facilitate its adoption by ISPs. The advantages of placing
the services of PRESERVE DNS in the cloud or on a cloud service provider could multiply if it is placed
on a Kubernetes cluster. This would provide operational continuity with semi-infinite scalability and
expandability. Since PRESERVE DNS uses the Hyperledger Fabric platform that consists of Docker
containers, making a transition to a Kubernetes cluster is a viable and realistic option.
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